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I. INTRODUCTION 
As with many areas of the law, an exploration of tort theory often resembles an 
attempt to penetrate a labyrinth filled with dizzying turns, dead ends, and paths that 
lead back to where you began. Compared to "proximate causation" with its winding 
corridors filled with policy and foreseeability, the realm of "cause-in-fact" might 
seem trivial to navigate. Directions have been posted, and many of the pitfalls and 
Punji traps have been covered over. 
*J.D. expected, May 2009, Cleveland State University, Cleveland-Marshall College of 
Law; B.F.A. Bowling Green State University. The author would like to thank Professor 
Christopher Sagers for his insightful comments and advice on this Note. The author would 
also like to thank Melanie Shwab. who endured more discussion of tort causation rules than 
any one person should have to bear. 
1029 
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The problems presented by "tortfeasor indeterminacy" are perhaps the greatest 
remaining point of contention in the otherwise generally overlooked requirement of 
cause-in-fact. 1 The issue is deceptively simple; several defendants have breached a 
duty to the plaintiff and one of their breaches is the cause-in-fact of plaintiff's injury, 
but it is impossible to tell which one. 2 As a result. the plaintiff cannot meet his 
evidentiary burden on the element of cause-in-fact and is unable to recover.3 In 
response to the plaintiff's dilemma, courts have developed the doctrines of 
"alternative liability" and "market-share Iiability."4 Yet many courts and 
commentators have rejected these solutions as threats to the very structure of the tort 
law system.5 Attempts to conceptualize the doctrines have produced a multitude of 
conflicting explanations. many of which invoke the very rationales that have led to 
judicial reluctance in utilizing the doctrines." 
This Note will argue that previous attempts to explain alternative liability are 
unsatisfactory because they are inconsistent with traditional notions of cause-in-fact. 
Rather than attempting to explain alternative liability as a revolutionary concept, this 
examination will demonstrate that alternative liability can be completely explained 
by a careful application of traditional tort principles. That result will depend on 
recognition of a distinction between the original injury suffered by the plaintiff and 
the secondary injury that alternative liability allows recovery for-the loss of remedy 
for the original injury. Once this distinction is recognized, the current limitations on 
alternative liability are diminished and its modification into market-share liability is 
rendered unnecessary. 
In reaching its conclusion, Part JI.A of this Note will discuss the general 
requirements of cause-in-fact, define the problem of tortfeasor indeterminacy, and 
explore the difficulties it creates. Part II.B will examine alternative liability, the 
judicial solution developed by courts in response to tortfeasor indeterminacy. Part 
II.C will then examine the modification of alternative liability into market-share 
liability. Part liLA will examine previous explanations promulgated for alternative 
liability and market-share liability, showing why each is unsatisfactory. Part III.B 
will present a new explanation for alternative liability based on application of 
traditional tort rules to an independent cause of action for plaintiff's loss of remedy. 
Parts III.C and III.D will propose potential legal bases for this cause of action. Part 
III.E will examine the operation of this new cause of action. Part III.F will then 
demonstrate how this new explanation leads to the conclusion that joint and several 
liability, rather than the market-share modification, is the appropriate means for 
apportioning liability under alternative liability. 
11ndeed, one commentator has called market-share liability, one of the doctrinal responses 
to tortfeasor indeterminacy, "one of the most controver~ial doctrines in tort law." Mark A. 
Geistfeld, The Doctrinal Unity of'AlternatiJ•e Liabilitv and Market-Share Liability, 155 U. PA. 
L. REV. 447,447 (2006). 
2See infra notes 17-26 and accompanying text. 
3See inji·a note 27. 
4See infra Parts II.B-C. 
5See infra Part liLA. 
6See infra Part liLA. 
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II. JUDICIAL SOLUTIONS TO THE DILEMMA OF TORTFEASOR INDETERMINACY 
A. ldent(fying the Dilemma 
A generally recognized element of any plaintiff's prima facie tort cause of action 
is causation. 7 Professors Prosser and Keeton define the causal analysis as a 
determination of whether there is "some reasonable connection between the act or 
omission of the defendant and the damage which the plaintiff has suffered."8 The 
causal analysis consists of two parts: the initial determination of cause "in-fact" and 
the subsequent determination of "proximate'' or "legal" cause. 9 Although not the 
sole basis for imposing liability. cause-in-fact is traditionally considered one of the 
requirements for liability to attach to the tortious conduct of a defendant. 10 This Note 
is primarily concerned with a problematic issue that arises as part of the cause-in-fact 
analysis. 
At its most basic level. the cause-in-fact analysis is a determination of whether 
the particular conduct of the defendant was a "necessary antecedent" to the harm that 
the plaintiff has suffered. 11 This relation between conduct and harm is normally 
expressed in terms of a ''but-for'' test. The harm to the plaintiff would not have 
occurred but for the actions of the defendant or. phrased differently, if the defendant 
had not acted as he did, the harm to the plaintiff would not have occurred. 12 On a 
practical level then, the cause-in-fact requirement acts to prevent liability from 
attaching to conduct that is not essential to the occutTence of the harm plaintiff has 
suffered. 13 
7While causation problems are often most pronounced in cases of negligence, it is dear 
that the element of causation is not confined to negligence. The requirement extends in some 
form to every tort cause of action, including strict liability and the intentional torts. W. PAGE 
KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 263 (5th ed. 1984 ). 
8/d. 
9/d. at 263-65. In practice. the distinction may be somewhat artificial. It can be difficult 
to determine where the cause-in-fact analysis ends and the proximate cause analysis begins. 
As Prosser and Keeton note, the confusion is in part the result of a lack of precision in 
language used to describe the two parts of the analysis, as well as a failure to recognize that 
the cause-in-fact analysis necessarily involves a degree of non-factual hypothesizing. !d. This 
hypothesizing "creates a mental picture of a situation identical to the actual facts of the case in 
all respects save one: the defendant's wrongful conduct is now 'corrected' to the minimal 
extent necessary to make it conform to the law's requirements." David W. Robertson, The 
Common Sense of Cause in Fact, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1765, 1770 (1997). 
10KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, at 268. 
11 /d. at 265. 
121d. at 266. For illustrative purposes, it is helpful to break the cause-in-fact analysis down 
into its five distinct steps: 
(a) identify the injuries in suit; (b) identify the wrongful conduct; (c) mentally correct 
the wrongful conduct to the extent necessary to make it lawful. leaving everything else 
the same; (d) ask whether the injuries would still have occurred had the defendant 
been acting correctly in that sense; and (e) answer the question. 
Robertson, supra note 9, at 1771. 
13KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, at 266. It is important to note that necessity does not 
always equate to sufficiency. The conduct of two tortfeasors might combine to work an 
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In the simplest case of a single plaintiff and a single defendant tortfeasor, the but-
for test functions with little problem. However, the introduction of a second 
defendant tortfeasor derails the function of the test entirely in many cases. For 
example, the conduct of two tortfeasors simultaneously affects the plaintiff, and 
either tortfeasor' s conduct alone would produce the resulting harm to the plaintiff. 14 
While it is correct to say that either tortfeasor's conduct was sufficient to cause the 
resulting harm to the plaintiff, application of the but-for test leads to the immediate 
conclusion that neither tortfeasor's conduct can correctly be termed necessary to the 
occurrence of the resulting harm to the plaintiff. If either tortfeasor had not acted as 
he did, the other's conduct would still have produced the harm. Dogmatic adherence 
to the but-for test would render neither tortfeasor liable despite the fact that either's 
conduct would be independently sufficient to create the harm to plaintiff. In 
response to this anomalous result, the courts generally make an exception to the but-
for test and substitute a "substantial factor" test in cases of multiple sufficient causes, 
allowing liability to attach to the conduct of both tortfeasors. 15 The result is a 
conception of the cause-in-fact inquiry in which the element of cause-in-fact is 
established if the conduct is either necessary for the occurrence of the result or 
sufficient for its occurrence. 
This solution to the issue of multiple sufficient causes has been well received, 
and it is not the purpose of this Note to question that warm reception or dissect the 
substantial factor doctrine. 16 However, multiple sufficient causation is not the only 
problematic issue that the requirement of but-for causation generates. Tortious 
activity involving multiple potential tortfeasors may give rise to a variety of distinct 
but related but-for causation issues. In response to those issues, courts have adopted 
aggregate injury to plaintiff that neither tortfeasor's conduct would have accomplished alone. 
In such a case, both tortfeasors' conduct is necessary to the resulting harm, but neither taken 
individually is sufficient. However, the fact that neither tortfeasor's conduct is sufficient by 
itself would not protect either from liability. Under well-established principles of causation, 
"[e]ach of two or more persons whose tortious conduct is a legal cause of a single and 
indivisible harm to the injured party is subject to liability to the injured party for the entire 
harm." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 875 (1979); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARMS (TENTATIVE DRAFTS)§ 27 (Proposed Final Draft No. 
1, 2005). Thus, liability attaches to all necessary causes of an aggregate harm and sufficiency 
of the cause to the resulting harm is not required. 
14Professors Prosser and Keeton give this helpful illustration: "A stabs C with a knife and 
B fractures C's skull with a rock; either wound would be fatal, and C dies from the effects of 
both." KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, at 266. 
15ld. at 266-67. This exception is arguably based on concerns of policy as much as 
concerns of fact. 
16 /d. at 267. The readiness of courts to accept a modification to traditional notions of but-
for causation may be attributable, in no small part, to Professors Prosser and Keeton's 
reformulation of the substantial factor test in terms of but-for causation: 
When the conduct of two or more actors is so related to an event that their combined 
conduct, viewed as a whole, is a but-for cause of the event, and application of the but-
for rule to them individually would absolve all of them, the conduct of each is a cause 
in fact of the event. 
/d. at 268. The willingness of courts to accept this modification of but-for causation in cases 
of multiple sufficient causes will be of tremendous aid in understanding and justifying the 
conclusion about alternative liability reached below. 
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a corresponding variety of doctrinal solutions. This Note will refer to that loosely 
affiliated group of doctrines as doctrines of "collective liability." 
The focus of this Note is to examine and explain the related collective liability 
doctrines of "alternative liability" and "market-share liability" adopted by some 
courts to address the problems unique to the but-for causation issue of "tortfeasor 
indeterminacy." 17 In a prototypical case involving tortfeasor indeterminacy, two 
defendants have each behaved tortiously towards an injured plaintiff, but only one of 
the defendants could possibly have caused the harm. Tortfeasor indeterminacy then 
arises when circumstances render the plaintiff incapable of determining which of the 
two defendants' conduct actually caused the harm, although it is clear that one of 
them did. 18 
Summers v. Tice 19 illustrates the situation well. The plaintiff, Summers, and the 
two defendants, Tice and Simonson, were hunting for quail. 20 During the course of 
the hunt, Tice and Simonson, shooting at a quail that had been flushed, both 
discharged their shotguns in Summers' direction. 21 Summers was hit with birdshot 
in the lip and in the eye. 22 At trial, Summers had little difficulty establishing that 
both Tice and Simonson had breached a duty of care towards him. 21 
Instead, the evidential difficulty arose at the cause-in-fact stage of the analysis. 
While Summers had been hit twice, the pellet that lodged in his eye was the "major 
factor in assessing damages," and in analyzing the tortfeasor indeterminacy issue the 
17 At least one commentator refers to this but-for causation issue as "defendant 
indeterminacy." SeeM. Stuart Madden & Jamie Holian. Defendant Indeterminacy: New Wine 
into Old Skins, 67 LA. L. REV. 785 (2007). However, "tortfeasor indeterminacy" is a 
preferable alternative because it better reflects the crux of the issue under a traditional 
conception of but-for causation; that issue being that the identity of the tortfeasor among the 
defendants cannot be determined by the plaintiff. Therefore, the remainder of this Note will 
refer to the issue by that label. 
18It is important to distinguish tortfeasor indeterminacy from the deceptively similar 
situation where circumstances make it impossible for the plaintiff to make the initial 
determination whether any of multiple defendants has behaved tortiously towards him at all, 
but the nature of the injury points towards the likelihood that someone has behaved tortiously. 
See, e.g., Ybarra v. Spangard, 154 P.2d 687 (Cal. 1945) (allowing plaintiff who suffered 
suspicious injury while anesthetized to use doctrine of res ipsa loquitur against group of 
hospital staff involved in his surgery). In contrast, all defendants have breached a tort duty in 
a case involving tortfeasor indeterminacy; causation rather than breach of duty is the 
problematic issue. 
19 199 P.2d I (Cal. 1948). 
20/d. at 2. 
21/d. 
22/d. 
23See id. Summers had cautioned Tice and Simonson before the hunt to "keep in line" 
when shooting. /d. At the time of the shooting Summers had ascended a hill, putting him in 
front of Tice and Simonson in a triangular pattern. !d. The evidence established that Tice and 
Simonson could see Summers and knew his location at the time the shots were fired. /d. The 
court found that evidence sufficient to establish a breach of the duty of care owed to Summers 
by Tice and Simonson. !d. 
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court concerned itself only with that pellet. 24 The pellet that lodged in Summers' eye 
could have come from the gun of Tice or Simonson and had certainly come from one 
of them.25 However, it was impossible to make any determination that the pellet 
more likely than not had come from the gun of one rather than the other.26 As the 
situation stood, Summers was unable to meet his burden of proof on cause-in-fact 
with regard to either Tice or Simonson.27 
If Summers was to meet his burden of proof, he would have to resort to some 
form of collective liability theory that would allow him to prove cause-in-fact against 
Tice and Simonson as a group, rather than individually. The court first examined 
whether the doctrine of concert of action2s would allow Summers to attach liability to 
the conduct of both defendants. 29 If Summers could make a case for application of 
concert of action liability, it would be unnecessary for him to prove that one 
defendant, rather than the other, was the cause-in-fact of the injury to his eye 30 
24/d. at 3. The court's decision to disregard the second pellet that lodged in Summers' lip 
is inconsequential for purposes of exploring the issue of tortfeasor indeterminacy because, 
even if the court had concerned itself with both pellets. there was the distinct pos~ihility that 
both pellets had come from the same gun. !d. 
25/d. Applying the but-for test, it is clear that the conduct of the defendant whose shot hit 
Summers was both the necessary and sufficient cause of the injury to Summers' eye. The 
other defendant's conduct was neither a necessary nor a sufficient cause of the injury to the 
eye. See id. 
26Tice and Simonson were both using 12 gauge shotguns and 7V2 size birdshot. /d. at 2. 
27The burden of proof borne by the plaintiff with regards to causation is the typical 
preponderance of the evidence standard that it is "more likely than not that the conduct of the 
defendant was a cause in fact of the result.'' KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, at 269. Thw •. when 
the "probabilities ... are evenly balanced" the plaintiff fails to meet his burden of proof and 
cannot establish the prima facie case. !d. The addition of a hypothetical third defendant 
would further decrease the probability that any one defendant was the cause-in-fact of the 
harm. Geistfeld, supra note I, at 455. The result is that because tortfeasor indeterminacy 
always involves an even balance of probabilities between two or more defendants, the plaintiff 
will never be able to meet his burden of proof and make his prima facie case. 
28The doctrine of concert of action liability states that: 
For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another, one is 
subject to liability if he 
(a) does a tortious act in concert with the other or pursuant to a common design with 
him, or 
(b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial 
assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself, or 
(c) gives substantial assistance to the other in accomplishing a tortious result and his 
own conduct, separately considered, constitutes a breach of duty to the third person. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 876 (1979). 
29Summers, 199 P.2d at 2-3. 
30This result becomes clear in light of the commentary. Once concert of action has been 
established each defendant becomes vicariously "liab[le] for the acts of the others, as well as 
for his own acts." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 876 cmt. a (1979). Therefore. it is 
irrelevant which defendant was actually the cause-in-fact of the harm because one defendant is 
liable as the true cause-in-fact and the other defendant is vicariously liable under concert of 
action liability. 
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Ultimately, the court concluded that application of concert of action in similar cases 
had "strain[edj that concept."31 If Summers was to succeed, it would have to be on 
some other theory of collective liability. 
B. The Summers Solution: Alternative Liahilitv 
The California Supreme Court was faced with a dilemma because, under 
traditional tort principles, either Tice or Simonson was liable to Summers for his 
injury, but it was impossible to tell which one. Then-existing theories of collective 
liability were of no aid. In response, the court developed and applied a new theory 
of collective liability that has come to be known as alternative liability. 
The doctrine of alternative liability conceived by the Summers court allows an 
injured plaintiff to shift the burden of proof to the defendants in cases of tortfeasor 
indeterminacy. 32 Rather than require the plaintiff to "pin the injury'' on a particular 
defendant, all defendants are presumed liable. and a defendant must ·'absolve himself 
if he can."" fn this way, the plaintiff's evidentiary problem is solved by exempting 
him from the requirement of identifying the tortfeasor among the defendants. \.J 
The Summers court justified this result on several grounds. The foremost 
justification given by the court was the "practical unfairness" that Summers would 
be left without redress for his injury simply because he could not identify which 
defendant had most likely injured him. 35 The court emphasized that both Tice and 
Simonson had breached the duty of care owed to Summers and that one of the two 
had certainly caused the injury to Summers' eye. \6 Given the ''relative position of 
31 Summers, 199 P.2d at 3. The coutt did not elaborate on precisely why application of 
concert of action liability to the facts of the case would be inappropriate. but an examination 
of the requirements of the doctrine are revealing. Section (a) requires tortious conduct that is 
"in concert" or "pursuant to a common design"' between the defendants and sections (b) and 
(c) require that the second defendant give '"substantial assistance" or "encouragement" to the 
tortious conduct of the first. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (1979). Tice and 
Simonson were clearly not acting as part of a common design to shoot Summers: there is no 
apparent reason to believe that they even acted as part of a common design to ~hoot at the 
quail. Likewise, there is nothing to compel a conclusion that one assisted the other or 
encouraged him. The shots were independent of each other and either simultaneous or in 
quick succession. The conduct is simply not indicative of the explicit or implicit ··agreement 
to cooperate in a particular line of conduct or to accomplish a particular result"" that the 
doctrine is meant to address. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF Torns * 876 cmt. a ( 1979). 
32Summers, 199 P.2d at 4. 
3.1/d. 
34The American Law Institute adopted the California Supreme Court's alternative liability 
theory in this formulation: 
Where the conduct of two or more actor~ is tortious, and it is proved that harm has 
been caused to the plaintiff by only one of them, but there is uncertainty as to which 
one has caused it. the burden is upon each such actor to prove that he has not cauo;ed 
the harm. 
RESTATEMENT(SECONIJ)OFTORTS * 4338(3) (1965). 
35Summers. 199 P.2d at 3--4 (quoting JOHN H. WIGMORE, SELECT CASES UN lllF LAW OF 
TORTS§ 153 (1912)). 
36Id. at 4. 
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the parties," the fair solution was to place the burden of an unjust loss on the 
defendant that, while he had not caused the injury, had certainly breached a duty to 
Summers, rather than place the burden of an unjust loss on the totally innocent 
Summers. 37 The court also stressed that in most cases the defendants will be better 
able to offer evidence as to who caused the injury and would be free to introduce 
such evidence in an effort to extricate themselves from liability.1x 
With the aid of the new alternative liability rule, Summers was able to make his 
prima facie case of liability against Tice and Simonson.39 For the same reasons that 
it shifted the burden regarding causation to the defendants, the court further held that 
Tice and Simonson were jointly liable for the whole harm and shifted the burden of 
proof on apportionment to them as well. 40 Summers was free to collect his full 
recovery from the defendants in any way he could, and it would then be up to Tice 
and Simonson to litigate apportionment between each other.41 
C. Expanding the Solution: Market-Share Liability 
Thirty-two years after the Summers decision, the California Supreme Court 
expanded the doctrine of alternative liability in Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories.42 
Once again, the court was faced with a troubling case of tortfeasor indeterminacy. 
Sindell and her fellow class members were suffering from cancer43 as a result of their 
mothers' use of the drug diethylstilbesterol (DES) during pregnancy. 44 The 
complaint named eleven manufacturers of DES.45 However, Sindell was unable to 
identify the manufacturer of the DES taken by her mother due to the nature of the 
drug and the circumstances surrounding its distribution.46 Therefore, the trial court 
37/d. 
38/d. It seems unlikely that this was the primary justification in the mind of the court. 
Indeed, it has been pointed out that in Summers itself the defendants did not appear to have 
any "better access to the evidence than the plaintiff." Geistfeld, supra note l, at 473. 
39Summers, 199 P.2d at 5. 
40/d. 
41/d. 
42607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980). 
43The plaintiffs exhibited adenocarcinoma, a form of cancer with a minimum ten to twelve 
year latency period, after which deadly cervical and vaginal growths quickly begin to spread. 
/d. at 925. In addition, the plaintiffs exhibited precancerous cervical and vaginal growths 
called adenosis. /d. 
44DES is a synthetic form of estrogen that was marketed for the prevention of miscarriages 
from 1947 until 1971. !d. 
45/d. 
46DES was an unpatented fungible drug, "produced from a common ... formula" and 
customarily prescribed by its "generic rather than its brand name.'" Id. at 926. Identification 
of a particular manufacturer was made even more difficult because as many as 300 companies 
manufactured DES during the twenty-four years it was marketed for use by pregnant women. 
Geistfeld, supra note I, at 477. Moreover, manufacturers came and went from the DES 
market throughout the relevant period. !d. These factors combined with the long latency 
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dismissed the complaint for failure to identify the defendant whose product had 
caused the injury.47 On appeal, the California Supreme Court examined and found 
inapplicable several theories of collective liability, including Summers' alternative 
liability rule. Instead, the court opted to apply a new variant of alternative liability 
that is now known as market-share liability. 
As in Summers, one of the alleged theories of recovery against the multiple 
defendants was concert of action liability. Sindell sought to hold the defendant drug 
companies jointly liable under a concert of action theory based on "express and 
implied agreements" and "collaboration" in the development, approval, and 
marketing of DES.48 The court rejected the concert of action theory on grounds that 
there was no agreement between the defendants to commit the tortious act.44 The 
defendants had acted in a "parallel" but independent manner, and the composition of 
the drug was dictated by its scientific formula rather than by any understanding 
between the defendants. 5° 
Likewise, the court considered but rejected recovery against all defendants based 
on the theory of enterprise liability first developed in Hall v. E./. du Pont de 
Nemours & Co. 51 Unlike the defendants in Hall, the DES manufacturers had not 
"delegated some functions relating to safety to a trade association"; rather, the 
industry standard was dictated to a significant degree by the Food and Drug 
Administration.52 Therefore, the court refused to apply industry-wide liability under 
the Hall rationale because there was no indication that the DES manufacturers had 
jointly controlled the risk. 53 
The court also considered alternative liability as a possible solution in the DES 
scenario, ultimately concluding that the Summers formulation could not be fairly 
applied. 54 The sheer number of possible tortfeasors was the decisive factor militating 
against application of alternative liability in Sindell. 55 The court observed that in 
Summers there was a fifty percent probability that each defendant was the tortfeasor 
because there were only two defendants who had breached a duty to the plaintifr_06 
period of the injury resulted in tortfeasor indeterminacy problems in much of the DES 
litigation. 
47 Sindell, 607 P.2d at 926. 
48/d. at 932. 
49/d. 
50/d. at 932-33. 
51 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). In Hall, the district court contemplated shifting the 
burden on causation to members of an industry after it was established that a product 
manufactured by some member of the industry had caused an injury but the manufacturer 
could not be identified. /d. at 374. This result was justified by the defendants' joint control of 
the risk of injury through delegation of certain safety concerns to the industry's trade 
association. /d. at 374-78. 
52Sindell, 607 P.2d at 935. 
53/d. 
54/d. at 931. 
55/d. 
56/d. 
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In contrast, hundreds of manufacturers had produced DES: the probability that any of 
the named defendants had produced the specific DES that caused Sindell's injury 
was so low that ''it would be unfair to require each defendant to exonerate itself.'' 57 
Despite finding Summers' pure alternative liability inapplicable to the DES 
scenario, the court recognized that the same concerns of fairness were present 
because defendants who had behaved tortiously might escape liability, and the 
innocent plaintiff would be left without any remedy. 5s Therefore, the situation called 
for some modification of alternative liability that would compensate for the reduced 
probability that a particular defendant's product was truly the cause-in-fact of 
Sindell's injury. The court's solution was to allow the burden on causation to shift to 
the defendants if a "substantial share" of the market was joined in the action, limiting 
the liability of each defendant in proportion to its share of the DES marketed for use 
in preventing miscarriages. 5Y So long as a "substantial share" of the market was 
joined, the probability that the true tortfeasor was among the defendants would 
increase, and the unfairness of requiring each defendant to exonerate himself from 
liability would be "significantly diminished."60 The court acknowledged that under 
this new doctrine, some defendants would be held liable for an injury despite that 
injury being caused by a different manufacturer, but justified this result on the 
grounds that "each manufacturer's liability for an injury would be approximately 
equivalent to the [total] damages caused by fall] the DES it manufactured."61 
III. MAKING SENSE OF ALTERNATIVE LIABILITY AND MARKET-SHARE LIABILITY 
A. Previous Explanationsj(Jr Alternative Liability and Market-Share Liability 
Alternative liability and market-share liability raise significant questions as to 
their compatibility with the current tort regime in which establishing the defendant's 
conduct as the cause-in-fact of plaintiff's injury is still generally regarded as a 
requirement for a plaintiff to make out a prima facie case for liability. While a fair 
number of jurisdictions have adopted alternative liability and/or market-share 
liability."2 the perceived inconsistency with traditional tort law has led many other 
57/d. 
5
' /d. at 936. 
59/d. at 937. At first blush, the market-share theory adopted by the court bears a great 
resemblance to the enterprise liability theory first proposed in Hall, 345 F. Supp. at 374. 
However, the court was quick to point out that it was not allowing plaintiff to proceed on 
enterprise liability. Sindell. 607 P.2d at 933-36. Market-share liability as adopted by the 
California Supreme Court can be distinguished from enterprise liability by the absence of a 
requirement that the defendants exerci'e some form of joint control over the risk of injury 
posed by the industry's product. Despite this distinction, significant similarities between the 
two theories are still present because the court, when creating market-share liability, was 
highly influenced by a law review comment proposing a modified version of enterprise 
liability. !d. For the article relied on by the court, see Comment, DES and a Proposed Theorv 
of" Enterprise Liahi/itv, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 963 ( 1978). . 
wSinde/1, 607 P.2d at 937. 
61 /d. at 938. 
62See, e.g., Menne v. Celotex Corp., 861 F.2d 1453 (lOth Cir. 1988) (applying Nebraska 
law to find alternative liability applicable against asbestos manufacturers); McCormack v. 
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courts to reject one or both of the doctrines."' Even among courts that are less hostile 
to alternative liability or market-share liability, the inherent limitations of the 
doctrines as currently formulated often preclude their application in cases where they 
are sorely needed.64 The sharp divide between courts that praise the doctrines as 
Abbott Labs., 617 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Mass. 19g5) (applying Massechusetts law to allow use of 
market-share liability in DES context); McElhaney v. Eli Lilly & Co., 564 F. Supp. 265 
(D.S.D. I n3) (applying South Dakota law to allow use of market-share liability in DES 
context); Conley v. Boyle Drug Co., 570 So. 2d 275 (Fla.l990) (allowing use of market-share 
liability in DES context); Smith v. Cutter Biological, Div. of Miles Inc .. 823 P.2d 717 (Haw. 
1991) (allowing use of market-share liability against manufacturers of tainted blood product); 
Wysocki v. Reed, 583 N.E.2d 1139 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (finding alternative liability applicable 
against heparin manufacturers); Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 343 N.W.2d 164 (Mich. 1984) 
(allowing use of alternative liability in DES context): McGuinness v. Wakefern Corp., 6Qg 
A.2d 447 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991) (finding alternative liability applicable to case 
involving tainted lasagna); Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y. 1989) 
(allowing use of market-share liability in DES context); Minnich v. Ashland Oil Co .. 473 
N.E.2d 1199 (Ohio 1984) (allowing use of alternative liability against suppliers in ethyl 
acetate explosion); Martin v. Abbott Labs., 689 P.2d 368 (Wash. 1984) (allowing use of 
market-share liability in DES context); Collins v. Eli Lilly Co .. 342 N.W.2d 37 (Wis. 1984) 
(allowing use of market-share liability in DES context). 
63See, e.g., Jefferson v. Lead Indus. Ass'n. Inc., 106 F.3d 1245 (5th Cir. 1997) (applying 
Louisiana law to reject application of market-share liability to manufacturers of lead paint); 
Jackson v. Anchor Packing Co .. 994 F.2d 1295 (8th Cir. 1993) (applying Arkansas law to 
reject application of alternative liability to manufacturers of asbestos): Doe v. Cutter 
Biological, Div. of Miles, Inc .. g52 F. Supp. 909 (D. Idaho 1994) (applying Idaho law to reject 
application of alternative liability to manufacturers of tainted blood products): Tidier v. Eli 
Lilly & Co., 851 F.2d 418 (D.D.C. 1988) (applying Maryland and District of Columbia law to 
reject market-share liability in DES context); Griftin v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 
964 (W.D.N.C. 1986) (applying North Carolina law to reject application of market-share 
liability to manufacturers of benzidine congener dyes); Nutt v. A.C. & S. Co., 517 A.2d 690 
(Del. Super. Ct. 1986) (rejecting application of market-share liability to manufacturers of 
asbestos): Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 N.E.2d 324 (Ill. 1990) (rejecting use of market-share 
liability in DES context); Mulcahy v. Eli Lilly & Co., 386 N.W.2d 67 (Iowa 1986) (rejecting 
use of market-share liability in DES context): Zafft v. Eli Lilly & Co., 676 S.W.2d 241 (Mo. 
1984) (rejecting u'c of market-share liability in DES context); Shackil v. Lederle Labs., Div. 
of Am. Cyanamid Co .. 561 A.2d 511 (N.J. 1989) (rejecting application of market-share 
liability to manufacturers of DTP vaccine): Sutowski v. Eli Lilly & Co .. 696 N.E.2d 187 
(Ohio 1998) (rejecting use of market-share liability in DES context); Case v. Fibreboard 
Corp., 743 P.2d 1062 (Okl. J9g7) (rejecting application of market-share liability to 
manufacturers of asbestos): Senn v. Merrell-Dow Pharms. Inc .. 751 P.2d 215 (Or. 1988) 
(rejecting application of market-share liability to manufacturers of DTP vaccine); Gorman v. 
Abbott Labs., 599 A.2d 1364 (R.I. 1991) (rejecting application of market-share liability to 
drug manufacturers). 
64See. e.g .. Santiago v. Sherwin Williams Co., 3 F.3d 546 (I st Cir. 1993) (applying 
Massachusetts law to hold market-share liability inapplicable to products liability action 
involving lead paint); Sanderson v. Int' I Flavors and Fragrances, Inc., 950 F. Supp. 981 (C. D. 
Cal. 1996) (applying California law to hold alternative liability and market-share liability 
inapplicable to products liability action involving fragrance produch): Marshall v. Celotex 
Corp .. 651 F. Supp. 3g9 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (applying Michigan law to hold alternative liability 
inapplicable to products liability action involving asbestos); Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois. 
Inc., 941 P.2d 1203 (Cal. 1997) (holding alternative liability inapplicable to products liability 
action involving asbestos); Murphy v. E. R. Syuibb & Sons, Inc .. 710 P.2d 247 (Cal. 1985) 
11Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2008
1040 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:1029 
revolutionary and those that decry them as an abandonment of fundamental tort law 
can be explained, in part, by the lack of consensus on the precise rationale that 
underlies the doctrines.65 
Even a cursory examination of the facts in Summers and Sindell quickly 
illuminates why alternative liability and market-share liability are so problematic 
from a traditional tort law perspective. In both cases, the plaintiffs injury was most 
likely the result of the acts of only one defendant, but other defendants were also 
held liable. 66 Such a result seems to tly in the face of the cause-in-fact requirement.67 
This has led some commentators to suggest that the doctrines, especially market-
share liability, represent an abandonment of the traditional cause-in-fact requirement 
in favor of liability based purely on creation of unreasonable risk. 68 Another possible 
explanation is that the doctrines simply relax the plaintiff's burden of proof of cause-
(holding that failure to join substantial share of manufacturers made market-share liability 
inapplicable in DES action); Edwards v. A.L. Lease & Co., 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 259 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1996) (holding alternative liability and market-share liability inapplicable to products 
liability action involving defective residential drain pipe); Setliff v. E.I. duPont de Nemours 
& Co., 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 763 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (holding alternative liability and market-
share liability inapplicable in action brought by paint store employee against manufacturers of 
various harmful chemicals); Mullen v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 246 Cal. Rptr. 32 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1988) (holding market-share liability inapplicable to products liability action 
involving asbestos); Bly v. Tri-Continental Indus., Inc., 663 A.2d 1232 (D.C. 1995) (holding 
alternative liability inapplicable to action against manufacturers of petroleum products); King 
v. Cutter Labs., Div. of Miles, Inc., 685 So. 2d 1358 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (holding 
market-share liability inapplicable to action against manufacturers of tainted blood product); 
James v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 694 A.2d 270 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1997) (holding alternative 
liability inapplicable to action against manufacturers of petroleum products); Goldman v. 
Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 514 N.E.2d 691 (Ohio 1987) (holding alternative liability 
inapplicable to products liability action involving asbestos); Skipworth by Williams v. Lead 
Indus. Ass'n, Inc .. 690 A.2d 169 (Pa. 1997) (holding alternative liability and market-share 
liability inapplicable to products liability action involving lead paint). 
65Professor Geistfeld states that neither the courts nor academia has presented a clear and 
convincing rationale for alternative liability and market-share liability thus far and that this 
leads courts to be "understandably wary." Geistfeld, supra note I, at 452. 
6f'Porat and Stein opine that: 
[t]he evidential remedy that shifts the persuasion burden to the defendant would be 
unsuitable in many cases. This remedy can be effective only when the plaintiffs 
direct damage and evidential damage are attributable to the same defendant. When the 
direct and evidential wrongdoers are two different persons, ... shifting the burden of 
persuasion would not be justified: a person allegedly responsible for the plaintiffs 
direct damage must not bear liability for another person's wrong. 
ARIEL PORAT & ALEX STEIN, TORT LIABILITY UNDER UNCERTAINTY 165 (2001). 
67 See supra note 25. 
6NSee, e.g., Glen 0. Robinson, Multiple Causation in Tort Law: Reflections on the DES 
Cases. 68 VA. L. REv. 713 ( 1982) (proposing that market-share liability represents attachment 
and appm1ionment of liability based on each defendant's contribution to the aggregate risk of 
harm); accord David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public 
Law" Vision of the Tort Svstem, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849, 866-68 (1984); Richard W. Wright, 
Causation in Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1735, 1819-20 (1985). 
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in-fact in cases of tortfeasor indeterminacy. 6~ As Professor Geistfeld points out, both 
of these explanations are "problematic."70 
A conception of alternative liability and market-share liability in which liability 
is determined purely by creation of unreasonable risk suffers from several faults. 
Initially, it fails to explain convincingly why creation of unreasonable risk should 
expand the set of liable parties in cases of tortfeasor indeterminacy, but not in other 
cases, such as when only one person has behaved tortiously or when several persons 
have behaved tortiously but cause-in-fact can be demonstrated against the true 
tortfeasor. If taken to its logical conclusion, a risk-contribution regime need not 
require that the conduct in question ever injure anyone at all so long as it creates an 
unreasonable risk that such an injury might occur. 71 Indeed, a tort system that adopts 
risk-contribution on more than a superficial level would probably resemble a social-
insurance scheme rather than the current adversarial system in place today. 72 
Moreover, it is clear that many courts are unwilling to impose a regime in which 
liability attaches based purely on exposure to risk. 73 
Likewise, explaining alternative liability and market-share liability as a 
relaxation of the plaintiffs burden of proof with regard to cause-in-fact raises similar 
69Geistfeld, supra note I, at 456-57. 
70/d. at 457. 
71
"A deterrence-based torts system devises liability rules in order to reduce unreasonable 
risks. That objective does not depend upon the occurrence of physical harm, because an actor 
who faces liability for creating an unreasonable risk has an incentive to act reasonably." 
Geistfeld, supra note I, at 449. While such a result can be defended as furthering deterrence 
goals, the administrative costs of maintaining private litigation in the courts might lead to the 
conclusion that a system of pure regulatory penalties would be more efficient in terms of cost 
of enforcement versus resulting deterrence. 
72See Mulcahy v. Eli Lilly & Co., 386 N.W.2d 67, 75-76 (Iowa 1986); accord PORAT & 
STEIN, supra note 66, at 192. One can imagine enforcement through assessment of regulatory 
fines against persons creating unreasonable risks of harm to others. Those fines could be 
aggregated into a common fund (or funds) from which compensation would be paid out to 
persons injured by the fruition of those unreasonable risks. PORAT & STEIN, supra note 66, at 
I 04. Such a system suffers from a multitude of practical concerns beyond the immediate 
administrative costs, including defining the scope of relevant risks for purposes of aggregating 
recovered penalties into common funds for compensation purposes, as well as loss of a truly 
adversarial forum in which the defendant's motivation to defeat liability is directly balanced 
against the plaintiff's motivation to establish liability and recover. Moreover, such a system is 
unlikely to function properly because almost all persons creating unreasonable risks would 
need to be prosecuted and pay into the system. /d. at 109. Yet, persons who have not suffered 
harm may be unlikely to notice their exposure to risk and have less incentive to report 
violations because they will not be entitled to compensation from the common fund. ld. at 
I 09-10. For a detailed discussion of the problems inherent in administrative replacements for 
common law tort actions. see Kenneth S. Abraham, Individual Action and Collective 
Re.1ponsihility: The Dilemma of Mass Tort Reform. 73 VA. L. REV. 845, 885-898 ( 1987). 
71See Geistfeld. supra note I. at 452. Even the Wisconsin Supreme Court, the only court 
to explicitly adopt any form of risk-contribution theory, stated that it "d[id] not agree that [risk 
contribution] is a sufficient basis in itse!ffor liability," instead requiring some indication that a 
defendant "reasonably could have contributed in some way to the actual injury." Collins v. Eli 
Lilly Co .. 342 N.W.2d 37. 49 n.l 0 (Wis. 1984) (emphasis added). 
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i~sues. There is seemingly no justification for why such relaxation of the burden of 
proof is permissible in cases of tortfeasor indeterminacy, but not in situations where 
other factors make it difficult for plaintiff to prove cause-in-fact under the more 
likely than not standard. 7.J The arbitrariness of such an explanation is further 
highlighted by many courts' insistence that at some undefined point thereare simply 
too manv defendants and relaxation of the burden then becomes "unfair."7' 
Whe~her explained by relaxation, risk-contribution, or some other novel theory 
for attachment of liability, the case law indicates that many courts are unwilling to 
indulge a theory that diverges significantly from traditional tort concepts.76 In light 
of that reluctance, it seems prudent to determine if either alternative liability or 
market-share liability can be explained using traditional tort concepts, rather than a 
novel approach. 
Professor Geistfeld offers a theory of how the doctrines function that at first 
appears to comport with traditional tort law. He argues that alternative liability can 
be entirely explained by evidential grouping77 and that market-share liability is 
simply alternative liability modified to apportion liability between the defendants 
fairly. 7K Put simply, evidential grouping allows a plaintiff to group the defendants 
7
.JSI!e Senn v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals. Inc., 751 P.2d 215, 222 (Or. 1988). 
Professor Geistfeld notes that "tortious conduct routinely creates factual uncertainty regarding 
causation," yet in most of these cases plaintiff still bears the burden of proof. Geistfeld, supra 
note 1. at 456-57. 
75Sa Senn, 751 P.2d at 222. 
76Sce supra note 63. 
77Geistfeld, supra note I, at 471-77. 
7 ~/d. at 452. Even under the traditional conceptions of alternative liability and market-
share liability. the latter is often viewed as a variation of the former. The Sinde/1 court's 
explanation for its adoption of market-share liability clearly indicates that the court believed 
that market-share liability was a logical outgrowth of alternative liability. Sindell v. Abbott 
Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 936-37 (Cal. 1980). Nonetheless, the Sinde/1 court acknowledged that an 
··undiluted Summers rationale [was] inappropriate" because the number of DES manufacturers 
created "a possibility that none of the tive defendants in this case produced the offending 
substance." hi. In response, the court chose to '·approach the issue of causation from a 
different perspective'· and allow recovery based on the "corresponding likelihood" that the 
··percentage [of! DES sold by each [defendant] for the purpose of preventing miscarriage" was 
the same as the "likelihood that any of the defendants supplied the product which allegedly 
injured plaintiff." /d. at 937. This probabilistic explanation for market-share liability has led 
other courts to conclude that market-share liability cannot be justified by reference to its 
forerunner. For example, the Ohio Supreme Court concluded that its previous adoption of 
alternative liability could not justify adoption of market-share liability. Sutowski v. Eli Lilly 
& Co., 690 N .E.2d 1117, 191 (Ohio 1998). The critical distinction for the court was that 
alternative liability did not "relieve the plaintiff of the burden of identifying the tortfeasors." 
/d. To recuver under alternative liability the plaintiff was required to point to all the 
tortfea~.ors and demonstrate that they had behaved tortiously toward him. /d. The typical 
justification for market-share liability. that there is a likelihood that all defendants have 
behaved tortiow.ly towards some victim, was not compatible with this requirement. /d.; see 
ulso New York Tel. Co. v. AAER Sprayed Insulations, Inc., 679 N.Y.S.2d 21, 25 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1998) (stating that "[ijn contrast [to market-share liability], under alternative liability, a 
nexus between each defendant's conduct and the plaintiffs injury is fundamental"); accord 
Thomp,on v. John-; lvlanville Sales Corp .. 714 F.2d 58!, 583 (5th Cir. 1983) (stating that 
14https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol56/iss4/7
2008) ALTERNATIVE LIABILITY AND DEPRIVATION OF REMEDY 1043 
together and prove that, more likely than not, the conduct of the group was the cause-
in-fact of the plaintiff's injury. 79 Professors Prosser and Keeton's reformulation of 
the substantial factor test used in cases of multiple sufficient causes is a prime 
example of the evidentiary grouping principle. so Geistfeld argues that evidential 
grouping properly explains alternative liability in cases of tortfeasor indeterminacy 
hecause requiring "proof of individualized, but-for causation would absolve each 
defendant" despite the fact that the true tortfeasor is among the defendants. HI 
Although this explanation looks promising, there is a major flaw in the analogy 
between tortfeasor indeterminacy and the situation of multiple sufficient causation in 
which evidentiary grouping is traditionally applied. 
Evidentiary grouping is justified in cases of multiple sufficient causation because 
the normal evidentiary burden would absolve both defendants, even though the 
conduct of either was sufficient to bring about the harm. H2 Such a situation is not 
present in cases of tortfeasor indeterminacy. 83 In essence, Geistfeld argues that it is 
justifiable in cases of tortfeasor indeterminacy to disallow use of exculpatory 
evidence by a defendant whose conduct is not the cause-in-fact of the harm in order 
to prevent the escape of the defendant whose conduct is the cause-in-fact of the 
harm. 84 Such a result is inherently less equitable than allowing use of evidentiary 
grouping in multiple sufficient causation where either defendant taken alone would 
be a but-for cause of the harm. 85 
application of alternative liability in the absence of '·such connection would beg the question 
of causation entirely"). This result does not arise under the conception of alternative liability 
proposed in this note because even if plaintiff cannot demonstrate that he was exposed to a 
particular defendant's breach of duty with regard to the primary injury, plaintiff can still 
recover if he can show that he suffered a secondary injury through obfuscation of the causal 
analysis as a result of defendant's conduct. See infra Part Ili.B. Whether or not a particular 
defendant caused the primary injury, all defendants "certainly int1icted the plaintiff's 
evidential damage and wrongfully so." PORAT & STEIN. supra note 66, at 169. 
79Geistfeld. supra note I, at 460. Evidentiary grouping can be differentiated from 
doctrines of liability grouping. Liability grouping allows one defendant to be held liable for 
the tortious conduct of another because the defendants have "acted as a group in causing 
plaintiffs injury," as in a case of concert of action or conspiracy. /d. In contrast, evidentiary 
grouping simply aids the plaintitl in proving his prima facie case, with liability attaching to 
each defendant's conduct based on its own tortious nature. !d. 
xoSa supra note 16. 
~ 1 Gcistfeld, supra note I, at 464, 469-73. 
R2See sources cited supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text. 
x \)'a discussion supra note 25. 
x'
1Geistfeld, supra note I, at 463-64. 
'"As one commentator has noted. the substantial factor test, from which the principle of 
evidentiary grouping is derived, should only be used in '"combined force' situations in which 
we are morally certain that the hut-for test stubbornly persists in yielding the wrong answer." 
Robertson. supra note 9, at 1778-80. Application of the substantial factor test outside the 
narrow realm of multiple sufficient causation is completely inappropriate. !d. at 1779-80. 
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Geistfeld justifies his conclusion by examining the "evidentiary inconsistency 
produced by this form of exculpatory proof."86 He argues that because the defendant 
is a member of a group that has caused the harm, a defendant that points to the 
probability that another group member was just as likely the cause would 
''effectively den[y] that the plaintiff was harmed by any of the defendants."87 This 
justification is unsatisfactory because it presupposes that the plaintiff should be 
allowed to group the defendants for evidentiary purposes. 
B. Understanding Alternative Liability as an Independent Cause of Action 
The inequity in Geistfeld's approach can be resolved by redefining the injury to 
the plaintiff that allows grouping the defendants together. Geistfeld conceives of 
alternative liability as a doctrine that shifts the burden of proof on cause-in-fact with 
regard to the plaintiff's injury in the same manner and for the same reasons that 
burden shifting is applied in cases of multiple sufficient causation. This explanation 
fails because multiple sufficient causation and tortfeasor indeterminacy are not 
sufficiently analogous. However, if the defendants are grouped together based on 
their contribution to the plaintiff's inability to determine the true tortfeasor, rather 
than the statistical probability that each defendant might be the true tortfeasor, 
shifting the burden of proof on cause-in-fact to the defendants can be rationally 
justified. 
A defensible explanation of alternative liability then initially requires recognition 
that the doctrine is in reality an independent cause of action for the plaintiffs loss of 
remedy. Professor Prosser proposed a very similar idea as the solution to a 
particularly troublesome variation of multiple sufficient causation. 88 Likewise, Porat 
and Stein propose a broad tort cause of action for what they refer to as "evidential 
damage."89 While neither of those theories focus on the loss of remedy itself in the 
8
"Geistfeld, supra note 1. at 466. 
87/d. 
88In that case, the first defendant had leased the second defendant a car with defective 
breaks. Saunders Sys. Birmingham Co. v. Adams. I I 7 So. 72. 73 (Ala. 1928). While later 
driving the car, the second defendant collided with the plaintiff, and it was shown that the 
second defendant had failed to even apply the brakes. /d. at 74. The Alabama Supreme Court 
refused to allow liability against either defendant because the brakes, though defective, were 
never used, and if they had been used they would not have worked. !d. In effect, "each 
defendant's wrongful conduct kept the other's from becoming operative," derailing the 
determination of cause-in-fact. Robertson. supra note 9, at 1787. Commenting on Saunders, 
Prosser suggested that both defendants might have been held accountable because "each, by 
his negligence, has deprived the plaintiff of a cause of action against the other, and so should 
be liable." WILLIAM L. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS ~ 41, at 239-40 n.25 (4th ed. West 
1971 ). The precise scenario is somewhat different than that presented in cases of tortfeasor 
indeterminacy because in Saunders either defendant's conduct would have been a but-for 
cause of the harm in the absence of the other defendant's conduct. Nonetheless. the essence of 
Prosser's independent tort against one wrongdoer for deprivation of the case against another 
wrongdoer functions just as well in a case of tortfeasor indeterminacy. 
89PORAT & STEIN, supra note 66. at 160-206. The "evidential damage doctrine" they 
propose focuses on an offending party's "infring[ing] the plaintiffs legitimate interest in ... 
information" that is "necessary for ascertaining the cause of her or his direct damage." /d. at 
167. Thus, their theory is much broader than the theory put forth in this Note and would apply 
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way proposed in this note, they demonstrate that a tort action based on defendant's 
interference with plaintiff's successful pursuit of a legitimate suit is not such a 
radical idea. 
An understanding of alternative liability as a distinct cause of action begins with 
the widely accepted principle that tortious conduct can create a "bundle" of risks any 
of which the tortfeasor will be liable for if they come to fruition. 90 In a prototypical 
case of tortfeasor indeterminacy, the plaintiff has suffered two distinct injuries. 
Initially. plaintiff suffers the "primary" injury as a result of the tortious conduct of a 
single tortfeasor. Plaintiff then suffers a "secondary" injury that is to some degree 
derivative, the loss of his remedy for the primary injury due to the inability to 
demonstrate cause-in-fact. 91 There is always the risk of the primary injury, but in 
cases of tortfeasor indeterminacy, there is also a risk of the secondary injury. While 
the proposition may seem peculiar, Joss of remedy as a distinct injury is consistent 
with the definition of the term injury as "the violation of another's legal right, for 
which the law provides a remedy."92 Assuming that persons have a legally protected 
right to redress for injury, then it logically follows that wrongful deprivation of that 
right is, in itself, also an injury. There are strong indications that, in cases of 
tortfeasor indeterminacy, the plaintiff has a legally protected right to redress for 
injury. 
C. Equitable and State Constitutional Guarantees as a Source for the Legal Right to 
a Remedy 
One possible source of a legal right to redress for injury might be found in state 
constitutional protections. Equity jurisdiction is predicated on the maxim that 
"equity will not suffer a wrong, or, as sometimes stated, a right, to be without a 
remedy."93 This maxim is concretized in many state constitutions in so-called "right 
to remedy clauses."94 Thirty-nine state constitutions contain right to remedy clauses 
that "expressly guarantee every person remedies for all tortious injuries to 'their 
persons, property, and reputation. "'95 
in many cases outside the realm of tortfeasor indeterminacy. /d. at 185. Nonetheless. their 
theory applies to cases of tortfeasor indeterminacy in a similar fashion to that proposed in this 
note, but ultimately reaches the opposing conclusion regarding the appropriateness of 
allocating liability based on market-share. /d. at 162, 186-87. 
90See Marshall v. Nugent. 222 F.2d 604,610-11 (1st Cir. 1955). 
91
"Evidential damage must thus be perceived as an indirect or adjective damage: its 
existence will always depend on the actual ... occurrence of a directly actionable damage." 
PORAT & STEIN, supra note 66, at 161. 
92BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 801 (8th ed. 2004). 
9330A C.J.S. Equity~ 130 (2007). 
94See Holland ex rei. Williams v. Mayes. 19 So. 2d 709, 711 (Fla. 1944); see also 16B 
AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 623 (2007); Robert S. Peck & Ned Miltenberg, Right to a 
Complete Remedy; Open Courts, in 3 ATLA's LITIGATING TORT CASES § 29:15 (Roxanne 
Barton Colin & Gregory S. Cusimano eds., 2007). 
95Robert S. Peck & Ned Miltenberg, Ri[?ht to a Complete Remedy; Open Courts, in 3 
ATLA's LITIGATING TORT CASES§ 29:15 (Roxanne Barton Colin & Gregory S. Cusimano 
eds., 2007). See, e.f?., ALA. CONST. art. 1, § 13; ARK. CON ST. art. II, § 13; COLO. CON ST. art. II, 
§ 6; CONN. CONST. art. I. § I 0; DEL. CONST. art. I, § 9; FLA. CON ST. art. I, § 21; IDAHO CON ST. 
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A right to remedy provision of a state constitution has already been utilized in at 
least one case of tortfeasor indeterminacy. In Collins v. Eli Lilly Co.,96 the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court justified its adoption of market-share liability, in part, on 
that state's constitutional guarantee of a remedy at law.97 Indeed, the court 
concluded that by virtue of the right to remedy provision of the Wisconsin 
Constitution the plaintiff was '"entitled to a remedy at law for her injuries." 9g 
However, the manner in which the Collins court utilized the right to remedy clause 
appears inconsistent with the court's own interpretation that the provision allows 
'"the common law ... to grow ... within the doctrine of stare decisis ... applying 
principles of common law to new situations as the need [arises]."99 Rather than 
applying established common law principles in an attempt to fashion a remedy, the 
Collins court adopted market-share liability under a conception of that doctrine that 
it acknowledged "deviate[d] from traditional notions of tort law."HxJ The result is 
unfortunate because the Collins court had before it adequate law that, if applied 
creatively, would have allowed the court to circumvent the plaintiff's tortfeasor 
indeterminacy problem and provide a remedy using established tort principles. 
Right to remedy provisions originally found their way into state constitutions, in 
large part, as a bulwark against perceived legislative curtailment of common law 
rights. 101 Hence, courts often employ such provisions to invalidate statutory 
abridgment of common law rights when a legislature "impose[s] an impossible 
condition on plaintiffs access to courts and ability to pursue an otherwise valid tort 
claim." 102 Often, a constitutional right to remedy is recognized only as a guarantee 
of remedy for rights already recognized by statute or common law. 103 Thus, such a 
provision is typically not interpreted to confer any quasi-legislative power upon 
courts, but rather emphasizes that courts must be free to "exercise the recognized 
judicial power of applying established principles of law to new conditions and new 
facts as they arise" so long as the injury "constitutes an invasion of a legal right." 104 
This interpretation appears consistent with the notion that equity jurisdiction is 
art. I, § 18; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 12; LA. CONST. art. I, § 22; ME. CONST. art. I, § 19; MISS. 
CONST. art. Ill, § 24; Mo. CONST. art. I § 14; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 16; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 
13; N.C. CONST. art. I,§ 18; N.D. CONST. art. I,§ 9; OHIO CONST. art. I,§ 16; OKLA. CONST. 
art. II,§ 6; OR. CONST. art. I,§ 10; PA. CONST. art. I,§ II; S.C. CONST. art. I,§ 9; S.D. CONST. 
art. VI, § 20; TENN. CON ST. art. I, § I 7; TEX. CON ST. art. I, § I 3; UTAH CONST. art. I, § II; W. 
VA. CONST. art. III, § 17; WIS. CONST. art. I § 9; WYO. CONST. art. I, § 18. 
96342 N.W.2d 37 (Wis. 1984). 
97/d. at 45. 
ygld. 
100/d. 
101 See Peck & Miltenberg, supra note 94. 
102Martin v. Richey. 7 I I N.E.2d 1273, I 284 (Ind. 1999) (holding application of two-year 
statute of limitations unconstitutional as applied to plaintiff whose latent breast cancer 
precluded discovery of the injury prior to the expiration of the limitation period). 
103Barnes v. Kyle, 306 S.W.2d I, 3 (Tenn. 1957). 
104Cason v. Baskin, 20 So. 2d 243, 250-5 I (Fla. I Y45). 
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limited to situations in which establi~hed law is in some way incapable of vindicating 
a plaintiffs rights. 105 
Despite the limitation that they cannot create entirely new means of redress, right 
to remedy provisions are adequate to provide a means to protect plaintiffs in cases of 
tortfeasor indeterminacy. As Professor Geistfcld points out, in cases of tortfeasor 
indeterminacy the plaintiff has already sufficiently demonstrated that he is legally 
entitled to a remedy at law against some member of the group of indeterminate 
tortfeasors. 106 The plaintiff is deprived of a remedy at common law that he would 
otherwise be entitled to by an evidentiary difficulty that results from the wrongful 
conduct of the indeterminate tortfeasors. 107 
The historical backdrop of right to remedy provisions does not necessitate a 
conclusion that they can only be used as a shield against legislative obstruction of 
legal redress. The same concern that a plaintiff will be faced with "impossible 
conditions" to recovery are present when the plaintiff is deprived of his legal remedy 
by the nature of some private party's conduct. In Collins, the court noted that the 
evidentiary difficulty created hy the nature of the defendants' conduct resulted in an 
"insurmountable obstacle" for the plaintiff "even if she can establish all the 
remaining elements of her cause of action." 10x There is little practical difference 
between attempted legislative curtailment and the evidentiary difficulty created by 
tortfeasor indeterminacy. Tortfeasor indeterminacy confronts a plaintiff with hurdles 
to recovery that are just as "impossible" and "insurmountable" as statutory 
abridgement of a common law right. Thus. by the nature of their conduct, 
indeterminate tortfeasors have violated plaintiffs legal right to a remedy as surely as 
a legislature that imposes an unconstitutional statute of limitations or repose. Collins 
seems to support this conclusion. 
Because no legislative curtailment was involved in Collins, it appears the court 
broadly interpreted the right to remedy provision of the Wisconsin Constitution as a 
protection against curtailment of existing legal rights by both public and private 
105The maxim that "equity will not suffer a wrong to be without a remedy" generally 
provides for equitable jurisdiction only where (I) "the right itself' is "not recognized as 
existing by the law," (2) the right exists at law but the remedy is "one which the law cannot or 
does not administer at all," or (3) the right exists at law but "the remedy as administered by 
the law [is] inadequate, incomplete, or uncertain." Ver Brycke v. Ver Brycke, 843 A.2d 758, 
774 n.l2 (Md. 2004) (quoting 2 POMEROY, EQl:ITY JURISPRUDENCE§§ 423,424 (5th ed.)). 
106Geistfeld, supra note I, at 471. In other words, the plaintiff has demonstrated that he 
can prove every single element of the underlying tort against the indeterminate tortfeasors, 
save cause-in-fact. Moreover. the plaintiff has shown that only the nature of the indeterminate 
tortfeasors' conduct prevents him from proving cause-in-fact against one of them and 
recovering compensation. PoRAT & STEIN, supra note 66, at 174-75. 
107The Sinde/1 court examined and rejected this explanation, stating that "although the 
absence of such evidence i' not attributable to the defendants eitht>r, their conduct in 
marketing a drug the etlects of which are delayed for many years played a significant role in 
creating the unavailability of proof." Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 936 (Cal. 1980). 
The court patently contradicted itself by asserting that the plaintiff's inability to prove cause-
in-fact was not "attributable" to the defendants, while simultaneously noting the "significant 
role" their conduct played in creating that result. 
10xCollins v. Eli Lilly Co., 342 N.W.2d 37,45 (Wis. !984). 
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actors when it concluded that the plaintiff was "entitled to a remedy." 109 This then 
lays the foundation for a defensible justification of why the court could have applied 
alternative liability in Collins. Plaintiff was entitled to her remedy at common law 
by virtue of the right to remedy provision of the Wisconsin Constitution. 110 
However, the nature of the defendants' conduct made it impossible for plaintiff to 
establish cause-in-fact against the true tortfeasor, thereby infringing her right to 
remedy under the Wisconsin Constitution. This violation of the plaintiff's 
constitutionally protected right to a remedy constituted a distinct injury from the 
primary injury. The court could then have used its equitable power under the right to 
remedy provision itself to allow recovery for violation of that right against all the 
indeterminate tortfeasors because the conduct of all of them contributed to plaintiff's 
loss of remedy. 111 In this way, the court could have provided the plaintiff with a 
remedy while remaining faithful to its previous interpretation that the Wisconsin 
Constitution's right to remedy provision allowed the court to craft a remedy using 
established tort principles. 112 
While right to remedy provisions of state constitutions provide a potentially 
weighty source for the legal rights violated by the actions of defendants in cases of 
tortfeasor indeterminacy, complete reliance on such provisions may not be possible 
in every state. Initially, it is important to remember that not all state constitutions 
contain a right to remedy provision. 113 In states with constitutions that do contain 
right to remedy provisions, there is still the possibility that such a provision will not 
be held applicable to the actions of private parties. 114 However, even if a state's 
constitutional right to remedy provision does not provide a directly actionable right 
that can form the basis of a tort action against private parties, it might still support a 
convincing public policy argument in favor of recognizing a cause of action for 
deprivation of remedy. 115 In states with no constitutional right to remedy provision 
at all, a court might still be swayed by the underlying equitable maxim that such a 
provision represents. 116 Moreover, in states with right to remedy provisions, it seems 
109/d. 
I 10/d. 
111 This result may appear a little odd in that the right to remedy provision provides both 
the legal right that is violated and the means to vindicate that right, but there is nothing that 
indicates such a result is wrong. 
112See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text. 
1 13See supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
114For example, many provisions of the North Carolina Constitution have been interpreted 
"chiefly to protect the individual from the State." State v. Ballance, 51 S.E.2d 731, 734 (N.C. 
1949). In a subsequent appellate opinion, the court relied on this justification in rejecting 
several claims under the state constitution by a private employee against his employer. 
Teleflex Info. Sys., Inc. v. Arnold, 513 S.E.2d 85 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999). 
115Despite the Teleflex court's general disapproval of a constitutional right of action 
against private parties, the court appeared to entertain an argument that the employer's actions 
had violated public policy embodied in the North Carolina Constitution's right to remedy 
provision, although ultimately concluding that the employer had made no such violation. /d. 
at 88. 
116See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text. 
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logical that the weight of the underlying equitable maxim could only be strengthened 
by such constitutional support. 
D. Judicially Recognized Common Law Duty as a Source for the Legal Right to a 
Remedy 
Even completely absent any constitutional or equitable guarantee of a legal 
remedy, an independent tort cause of action for deprivation of remedy could also 
operate on the basis of a judicially recognized common law duty to refrain from 
conduct that could foreseeably deprive an injured party of a remedy for injury to his 
person or property by confusing the cause-in-fact determination. In Summers' 
Canadian doppelganger. Cook v. Lewis, 117 the Canadian Supreme Court imposed 
alternative liability, in part, on grounds that each defendant had "impaired the 
[plaintiffs l remedial right of establishing liability ... in effect, destroy[ing] the 
victim's power of proof." 11 x Implicit in that statement is recognition that the legal 
right to redress for injury creates a corresponding duty not to interfere with that right, 
at least with regard to persons who have behaved tortiously to an injured party. 
In a variety of contexts. courts have addressed similar issues and held that 
persons have a duty not to impair a plaintiffs lawsuit or otherwise deprive plaintiff 
of a remedy for injury. For example, federal courts have recognized a cause of action 
against a government official whose conduct interferes with or deprives a plaintiff of the 
ability to bring suit. 119 Likewise, some courts have recognized an independent cause of 
action for negligent spoliation of evidence by a party to the underlying action. 120 Other 
courts have also recognized an independent cause of action for negligent spoliation of 
evidence by a nonparty to the underlying action. 121 Still other courts do not recognize 
117[1951] S.C.R. 830 (Can.). 
118/d. at832. 
119See De Nardo v. Schowen, 944 F.2d 908, 908 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating that "[i]t is 
certainly correct that the unlawful deprivation of a cause of action may rise to the level of a 
constitutional tort"); see also Pritchard v. Norton. 106 U.S. 124, 132 (1882) (stating that "a 
vested right of action is property in the same sense in which tangible things are property, and 
is equally protected against arbitrary interference. Whether it springs from contract or from 
the principles of the common law. it is not competent for the legislature to take it away"); 
accord Ban·ett v. United State>. 798 F.2d 565,575 (2d Cir. 1986). 
120See, e.g., In re Srnartalk Teleservices, Inc. Sec. Litig .. 487 F. Supp. 2d 947 (S.D. Ohio 
2007) (applying Ohio law); Foster v. Lawrence Mern'l Hosp., 809 F. Supp. 83 (D. Kan. 1992) 
(applying Kansas law); Holmes v. Arnerex Rent-A-Car, 710 A.2d 846 (D.C. 1998); Bondu v. 
Gurvich, 473 So. 2d 1307 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984), disapproved by Martino v. Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc .. 908 So. 2d 342 (Fla. 2005); Welton v. Ambrose. 814 N.E.2d 970 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2004); Swick v. New York Times Co., 815 A.2d 508 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003); 
Gicking v. Joyce Int'llnc .. 33 Pa. D. & C.4th 208 (Pa. Corn. Pl. 1996). 
121 See, e.g., Poynter v. Gen. Motors Corp., 476 F. Supp. 2d 854 (E.D. Tenn. 2007) 
(applying Tennessee law); Cont'l Ins. Co. v. Herman, 576 So. 2d 313 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1990); Thompson ex rei. Thompson v. Owensby. 704 N.E.2d 134 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998); Oliver 
v. Stimson Lumber Co., 993 P.2d II (Mont. 1999); Callahan v. Stanley Works. 703 A.2d 1014 
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1997); Hannah v. Heeter. 584 S.E.2d 560 (W.Va. 2003). 
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negligent spoliation of evidence as an independent cause of action, but still allow such 
claims under general negligence principles, 122 
A cause of action for negligent spoliation of evidence is not precisely analogous 
to the situation presented by tortfeasor indeterminacy. Spoliation of evidence, as the 
term is used by most courts, refers to destruction of evidence after the tortious action 
has already occurred. In contrast, tortfeasor indeterminacy results from evidential 
obfuscation that arises concurrently with the tortious action itself. The evidential 
obfuscation is not the result of some person's subsequent act, but rather it is an 
inherent consequence of the combined conduct of the indeterminate tortfeasors. 
Nonetheless, this discontinuity between negligent spoliation of evidence and 
tortfeasor indeterminacy is not problematic. The willingness of some courts to 
recognize a cause of action for negligent spoliation of evidence is still persuasive 
precedent for a duty not to obfuscate a victim's ability to prove cause-in-fact and 
prevent recovery, at least in certain circumstances. 
While agreeing that an underlying duty not to negatively affect a victim's lawsuit 
through evidential obfuscation could explain alternative liability, Professor Geistfcld 
questions whether such an explanation can account for Summers and Silulell in light 
of later California precedent. 123 At one time, California precedent clearly recognized a 
tort cause of action for negligent spoliation of evidence. 124 The validity of that precedent 
was later cast into doubt by the California Supreme Court's refusal to recognize an action 
for intentional spoliation of evidence in Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Superior 
Court125 and Temple Community Hospital v. Superior Court. 126 Thus, while the 
California Supreme Court did not directly address the existence of a cause of action for 
negligent spoliation of evidence, the appellate courts have assumed that the rationale of 
Cedars-Sinai and Temple preclude its further existence. 127 
122See, e.g., Tietjen v. Hamilton-Beach/Proctor-Silex, Inc., Nos. 97-CY-188, 97-CV-949. 
1998 WL 865586 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 1998) (applying New York law): Smith v. Atkinson. 
771 So. 2d 429 (Ala. 2000); Boyd v. Travelers Ins. Co .. 652 N.E.2d 267 (Ill. 1995): Guillory 
v. Dillard's Dep't Store, Inc., 777 So. 2d I (La. Ct. App. 2000); Gilleski v. Cmty. Mcd. Ctr.. 
765 A.2d 1103 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001); Coleman v. Eddy Potash, Inc .. 905 P.2d ~~-~ 
(N.M. 1995); Elias v. Lancaster Gen. Hosp., 710 A.2d 65 <Pa. Super. Ct. 1998). 
123Geistfeld, supra note I, at 484 n.l 02. 
124See Williams v. State, 664 P.2d 137 (Cal. 1983) (holding that, upon amendment of the 
complaint, plaintiff might be able to establish facts sufficient to show that police officer 
undertook a duty to preserve evidence necessary for plaintiff to recover civil damages for auto 
accident); Velasco v. Commercial Bldg. Maint. Co., 215 Cal. Rptr. 504 (Cal. Ct. App. 19~0) 
(holding that complaint against maintenance company for disposal of broken bottle needed for 
subsequent products liability action stated a recognized claim for negligent destruction of 
evidence); Clemente v. State, 161 Cal. Rptr. 799 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (allowing action against 
police officer whose "negligence in his conduct of [a] discretionary investigation" of an auto 
accident resulted in "virtual destruction of any opportunity on [plaintiffs] part to ohtain 
compensation for his physical injuries from the apparent tortfeasor"). 
125954 P.2d 511 (Cal. 1998) (holding that no caw.e of action exists for intenLional 
spoliation of evidence by a party to the underlying lawsuit). 
126976 P.2d 223 (Cal. 1999) (holding that no cause of action exi,ts for intentional 
spoliation of evidence by a third party not involved in the underlying lawsuit). 
127See, e.g., Coprich v. Supetior Court, 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 884. 887-91 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000): 
Fam1ers Ins. Exchange v. Superior Court. 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 51, 55-56 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000). 
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Nonetheless, that a particular jurisdiction has not previously recognized a duty to 
prevent evidential obfuscation and the resulting loss of remedy in cases of tortfeasor 
indeterminacy need not prevent it from doing so in the future. As the California 
Supreme Court has noted: 
[tJhe assertion that liability must nevertheless be denied because 
defendant bears no "duty'· to plaintiff "begs the essential question--
whether the plaintiffs interests are entitled to legal protection against the 
defendant's conduct. ... It (duty) is a shorthand statement of a conclu~ion, 
rather than an aid to analysis in itself .... But it should be recognized that 
'duty' is not sacrosanct in itself, but only an expression of the sum total of 
those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particular 
plaintiff is entitled to protection." 12x 
This conception of the element of duty virtually compels a court to make a 
careful analysis that is sensitive to not only preexisting law, but also policy 
ramifications when determining the existence of a duty. In the particular sphere of 
issues that tortfeasor indeterminacy involves. the Summers and Sindell courts came 
to the conclusion that persons deprived of their traditional remedy by the nature of 
the underlying tortious conduct that injured them were entitled to protection. Thus. 
recognition of a limited duty particular to cases involving tortfeasor indeterminacy 
would not be an extension of previously unknown protection to plaintiffs, but only 
an explanation of existing protection that comports with traditional notions of how 
tort law functions. 
Furthermore, an examination of the rationale behind Cedars-Sinai and Temple 
demonstrates that these cases should not control the California Supreme Court's 
determination of whether to recognize a duty to prevent evidential obfuscation in 
cases of tortfeasor indeterminacy. The key policy considerations that led the court to 
reject a cause of action for negligent spoliation of evidence are not applicable to 
cases involving tortfeasor indeterminacy. The court pointed to three policy 
considerations that weighed heavily against recognizing negligent ~poliation of 
evidence: "the conflict between a tort remedy for intentional first party spoliation 
and the policy against creating derivative tort remedies for litigation-related 
misconduct; the strength of existing nontort remedies for spoliation; and the 
uncertainty of the fact of hann in spoliation cases." 129 
Unlike in Cedars-Sinai and Temple, the evidential obfuscation in cases of 
tortfeasor indeterminacy is not the result of subsequent litigation-related misconduct. 
The evidential spoliation in Cedars-Sinai and Temple is factually distinguishable 
from the evidential obfuscation in cases involving tortfeasor indeterminacy. Cedars-
Sinai and Temple involved conduct that was both intentional and subsequent to the 
primary injury. On the other hand, tortfeasor indeterminacy involves a secondarily 
negligent aspect of already tortious conduct. Moreover, imposition of a duty to 
prevent evidential obfuscation in cases of tortfeasor indeterminacy would not lead to 
the potential cycle of "endless litigation" that is a concern in casei-. of spoliation of 
12~Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912,916 (Cal. 1968) (quoting WILLIAM L. PROSSER, THE LAW 
OF TORTS 332-33 (3d ed. 1964) ). 
129Cedars-Sinai. 954 P.2d at 515. 
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evidence. 130 The court also determined that sufficient non-tort remedies for 
evidential spoliation existed in the form of evidential inferences with regard to 
destroyed evidence, civil sanctions, and criminal penalties. 131 The factual differences 
between evidence spoliation and tortfeasor indeterminacy render all of these non-tort 
remedies inapplicable. Finally, the court pointed to the factual uncertainty of harm 
that would require a "retrial within a trial" in some cases of spoliation of evidence. L12 
This would not be of concern in cases of tortfeasor indeterminacy because the causal 
scenario itself will demonstrate the factual certainty of plaintiff's secondary injury. 133 
Therefore, previous precedent that declined to recognize a cause of action for 
spoliation of evidence should not preclude the California Supreme Court from 
explaining alternative liability in terms of a common law duty to prevent one's 
already tortious conduct from obfuscating the determination of cause-in-fact and 
thereby depriving the victim of a remedy. 
E. Operation of Alternative Liability as an Independent Cause of Action 
Once loss of remedy is recognized as a distinct secondary injury, alternative 
liability can be conceptualized without resort to novel theories of liability for the 
primary injury. Rather, alternative liability is actually shorthand for the application 
of several traditional tort law doctrines in a separate cause of action for the negligent 
deprivation of remedy. 134 
To comport with traditional tort law, the risk of the secondary injury would have 
to be foreseeable, or else the defendants would have no duty to guard against it. 115 
Therefore, to apply alternative liability it is necessary to determine whether, given 
the nature of the defendants' tortious conduct and the circumstances surrounding the 
conduct, there was a foreseeable risk that a potentially injured party might be unable 
to determine the responsible tortfeasor. 136 An examination of the case law shows that 
there is such a foreseeable risk in most cases when alternative liability has been 
applied. 137 Alternative liability can then be understood as imposing a duty on 
130/d. at 516-17. 
131 /d. at 517-18. 
132/d. at 520. 
133See sources cited supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text. 
134This characterization of the cause of action for deprivation of remedy as a species of 
negligence should not be confused with the underlying tortious nature of the primary injury. 
As application of cause of action in the DES scenario makes clear, alternative liability is just 
as applicable when the cause of action for the primary injury sounds in strict products liability. 
135KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, at 162. 
136Clearly, this is a consideration that bears on the existence of duty and concerns of 
proximate causation, not cause-in-fact. 
137The plaintiff in Sindell had argued that her inability to prove cause-in-fact was a 
foreseeable consequence of the defendants' failure to label DES as experimental. Sindell v. 
Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 930 n.l4 (Cal. 1980). The court rejected this argument, stating 
that the lack of evidence was the result of "the passage of time" rather than inadequate 
warning labels. /d. at 930. Thus, Sindell's inability to prove cause-in-fact was not a "'direct 
and foreseeable result' of defendants' failure to provide a warning label." /d. at 930 n.l4. 
This conclusion ignores the potential foreseeability of duplicative tortious conduct in general. 
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persons to refrain from tortious conduct that could prevent a person injured by such 
conduct from determining the identity of the responsible party. 138 
Conceptualizing alternative liability in this way explains why evidentiary 
grouping is permissible. Each defendant owed the plaintiff a duty to refrain from 
conduct that could foreseeably combine with the conduct of other defendants to 
obfuscate the cause-in-fact determination and deprive plaintiff of a remedy for his 
primary injury. Each defendant has breached this duty to plaintiff and the conduct of 
the defendants has combined to cause the plaintiff's loss of remedy. 139 The 
defendants may be grouped because they have affected a single injury. 
This also explains why a defendant may not escape liability by asserting the 
statistical probability that another defendant is just as likely the cause-in-fact of the 
primary injury-the defendants are not being held liable for the primary injury. 
With regard to the secondary injury, the reason defendants may not rely on 
exculpatory evidence depends on the number of defendants. If there are only two 
defendants, then both are necessary causes of the confusion and the resulting loss of 
remedy; both are but-for causes and neither will be allowed to escape liability simply 
because the other's conduct was also necessary. 140 If there are three or more 
defendants, then the result is a case of multiple sufficient causation, 141 and a 
defendant will not be permitted to assert the sufficiency of the other defendants' 
conduct to relieve himself from liability. 142 As Professor Geistfeld points out, the 
plaintiff makes his prima facie case against a defendant by proving that the group's 
conduct was the cause-in-fact of his injury and that defendant is a member of the 
Arguably, there was a foreseeable risk that a person potentially injured by exposure to DES 
would be unable to identify the manufacturer given the fungible nature of DES, its production 
by a multitude of manufacturers, the fact that it was prescribed and distributed generically, the 
lack of knowledge about its long-term effects, and its use by pregnant women. Porat and Stein 
argue that in most cases a "defendant's (actual or imputed) awareness of the fact that their 
actions may or may not end up in damage entails the (actual or imputed) awareness of the 
ensuing causal uncertainty." PORAT & STEIN, supra note 66, at 173. "A potential wrongdoer 
ought to foresee the possibility that his action will int1ict a traceless physical damage." !d. 
1380thers have also noted that alternative liability functions to hold one defendant 
"responsible for the way in which his tortious conduct interacted with the tortious conduct of 
the other defendant." Geistfeld, supra note I, at 476; see also PO RAT & STEIN, supra note 66, 
at 134. This would then mean that when a defendant's actions have created a case of 
tortfeasor indeterminacy he "might find himself under the duty to take reasonable steps to 
eliminate the uncertainty of the case." PO RAT & STEIN, supra note 66, at 171. 
139This explains why the Summers court was able to conclude that both "defendants were 
jointly liable and that thus the negligence of both was the cause of the injury or to that legal 
effect." Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d I, 2 (Cal. 1948). Such a statement is only coherent if the 
injury referred to is the Joss of remedy, rather than the injury to Summers' eye. 
140See discussion supra note 13. 
141 The situation is slightly more complicated than traditional multiple sufficient causation 
because at least two indeterminate tortfeasors are necessary for deprivation of plaintiff's 
remedy. Regardless, any individual defendant is a multiple sufficient cause as against any 
other individual defendant. 
142See discussion supra note 16. The t1aw in Professor Geistfeld's explanation is simply 
that the application of the evidentiary rule of multiple sufficient causation is direct rather than 
by analogy. 
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group. 14·1 Once the plaintiff proves his prima facie case, the burden shifts to the 
defendant just as it would after any standard plaintiff makes his prima facie case. 144 
Recognition of loss of remedy as the injury that alternative liability is meant to 
redress explains why the doctrine is limited to cases involving tortfeasor 
indeterminacy. Alternative liability is not necessary in cases involving multiple 
defendants where cause-in-fact can be demonstrated because there is no potential for 
the loss of remedy. Likewise, alternative liability is inappropriate in cases where the 
plaintiff simply cannot provide evidence that a lone defendant was actually the 
cause-in-fact of his harm because the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that he was 
ever entitled to a remedy at all. 145 This explains why courts applying alternative 
liability and market-share liability tend to emphasize the plaintiff's loss of remedy, 
not the defendants' superior access to evidence. 146 
F. Effect of this E.tplanation on the Viability of Market-Share Liability 
Explaining alternative liability as providing redress for loss of remedy for the 
primary injury leads to a two-fold conclusion regarding apportionment of liability. 
Initially, this explanation of alternative liability demonstrates that joint and several 
liability is the appropriate method for apportioning liability among the defendants 
regardless of their number. Each defendant is equally responsible for the resulting 
loss of remedy for the primary injury and because the loss of remedy is a single and 
indivisible harm, traditional tort doctrine will hold each defendant liable for the 
entire harm. 147 Moreover, because each defendant is liable for the entire harm there 
is no reason to require joinder of all defendants. Nevertheless, since all defendants 
are equally responsible, there is no equitable reason why the defendants should not 
be free to apportion liability among themselves on a pro-rata basis. 14~ 
143Geistfeld, supra note I, at 474. 
144A defendant can then refute the plaintiffs prima facie case against him in one of two 
ways. First, a defendant might demonstrate that he could not be the cause-in-fact of the 
plaintiffs primary injury. /d. at 475. By doing so, the defendant demonstrates that his 
conduct did not contribute to the confusion and resulting loss of remedy; in essence, he proves 
that he is not part of the group and should not bear their shared liability. Alternatively, a 
defendant might demonstrate which defendant was the cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's primary 
injury. /d. In doing this, the defendant essentially nullifies the effect of the group's conduct in 
depriving plaintiff of a remedy, negating the grounds for group liability. 
145See sources cited supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
14
"The confusion results from the Summers court's reference to Ybarra, which it found 
"quite analogous" to the facts of Summers. Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d L 4 (Cal. 1948). 
Defendants' superior access to evidence was the motivation for allowing the plaintiff to utilize 
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur against multiple defendants. Ybarra v. Spangard. 154 P.2d 
687. 690 (Cal. 1945). In Summers, by contrast. the defendants did not have superior access to 
evidence. See Geistfeld, supra note I, at 473. Allowing the plaintiff to group defendants 
together because the nature of their conduct had all contributed to the loss of remedy was what 
made Ybarra and Summers analogous, not defendants' superior access to evidence .. /d. 
147 See discussion supra note 13. 
14XSee RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 886A (1965). Reapportionment of liability 
between defendants might result from named defendants impleading other potential tortfeasors 
or from subsequent actions for contribution. The frequency of either situation would probably 
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Conversely, this shows that market-share liability as a modification of alternative 
liability is both unnecessary and inconsistent with the underlying rationale. 
Apportioning liability based on market-share is unnecessary because that approach is 
based on the faulty assumption that as the number of defendants increases the 
probability that any one defendant caused the injury decreases. 149 This problem is 
nullified by redefining alternative liability as compensating for loss of remedy, an 
injury to which all defendants have contributed equally. Likewise, market-share 
liability is inconsistent with alternative liability because a given defendant's share of 
the relevant market, if one even exists, has no proportional bearing on his 
contribution to the plaintiff's loss of remedy. 1" 0 
Porat and Stein reach a seemingly unjustifiable rejection of this result in applying 
their "evidential damage doctrine" to the prototypical DES market-share scenario. 151 
After concluding that an independent action for evidential obfuscation and loss of 
remedy could provide a means for recovery by plaintiffs faced with tortfeasor 
indeterminacy, Porat and Stein conclude that liability should be apportioned on "the 
value of the plaintiff's entitlement to information" as reflected in the "amount of 
money that the plaintiff would be willing to pay to each manufacturer to ascertain 
whether it is the one which actually inflicted her injury." 152 They then make an 
unexplained jump to the conclusion that this value is reflected in the magnitude of 
each defendant's risk-contribution and by derivation each defendant's share of the 
relevant market. 151 Such a result is logically incomprehensible and appears 
antithetical to their original proposition that recovery be based on the secondary 
evidential damage rather than the primary tortious conduct. Further, it would negate 
any potential benefit that could be derived from redefining the cause of action as an 
independent tort for deprivation of remedy by arbitrarily re-injecting market-share 
with its necessity of joining all potential tortfeasors and problematic determinations 
of relevant markets. This can only lead to a conclusion that Porat and Stein have 
erred and that joint and several liability is the appropriate means of apportionment 
rather than market-share liability. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The benefits of recognizing alternative liability as an independent cause of action 
for deprivation of remedy are numerous. This explanation demonstrates that the 
theoretical underpinnings of alternative liability are con~istent with the traditional 
not be so high as to burden the court system. Given the potential for defendant insolvency, as 
well as the potential that a defendant might be able to demonstrate that he could not have 
caused the injury, the plaintiff has every incentive to join as many defendants as practicable. 
1
•
9see <;ources cited supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text. 
150The duplicative aspect of the multiple defendants' conduct, not the quantity of that 
conduct, results in the lm,s of remedy. A defendant contributes equally to the indeterminacy 
whether his share of the market is 5% or 95c1c. 
151 Viewing all the defendants who have confused the cause-in-fact inquiry as multiple 
sufficient causes of the resulting injury to the plaintiff is rejected as "problematic·' with no 
other explanation. PORAT & STEtN. surra note 66. at 187 n.5. 
1 52 /d. at I 87. 
153/d. 
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tort law requirement that a defendant's conduct must be the cause-in-fact of a 
plaintiff's harm; alternative liability is not truly novel because it merely relies on 
careful application of pre-existing law. As shown above, alternative liability does 
not hold innocent defendants liable for harm caused by others. Rather, it holds each 
defendant responsible for the way in which his conduct has contributed to the loss of 
plaintiff's remedy for the primary injury. 
Perhaps just as important, explaining alternative liability as a separate cause of 
action for loss of remedy provides a justification why alternative liability in its 
"pure" form can be applied across the board. Each defendant has contributed equally 
to the plaintiff's loss of remedy and so application of alternative liability remains 
equitable regardless of how many defendants are involved. Further, this shows that 
market-share liability is an unnecessary and inequitable extension of alternative 
liability. 
If courts understand alternative liability in this way, perhaps they will be more 
likely to apply the doctrine in cases where it is needed. While this analysis may 
vindicate courts that have rejected market-share liability as inconsistent with 
traditional tort law, it also stands as a caution against discounting the possibility that 
pre-existing legal concepts, if understood fully and applied correctly, can often 
resolve new issues as they arise. 
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